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At a glance 
The statutory trust arising upon winding up does 
not create 'new' rights and destroy the old. 
The discharge of a debt according to its governing 
law destroys the status of a creditor. 
@ Distributions may not be made to former creditors, 
only to parties who remain creditors up to the date 
of the distribution. 
In cross-border insolvency cases, the hotchpot 
rule may become redundant if a foreign debt is 
discharged prior to any distribution in England. 
A lthough the English literature on cross-border insol- vency dates back almost two centuries,[ it is only 
during the last two decades that the subject has truly 
emerged from the shadows. The growing awareness of 
cross-border insolvency issues is no doubt closely bound to 
the increasing pace of globalisation, although a number of 
spectacular collapses - often referred to as 'mega- 
insolvencies' - have also been a factor. It is therefore of 
some interest to note that a small scene in the BCCI saga, 
surely one of the most notorious mega-insolvencies, was 
recently played out before the Privy Council. 
Wight v Eckhardt Marine GmbH firstly explored 
the relationship between the debt owed to a creditor and 
the statutory trust that arises in English law when the 
court makes a winding-up order; and secondly, in relation 
to the private international law rule that the discharge of 
a debt is determined by the governing (proper) law, it 
examined the effect of a discharge in a situation where a 
creditor had already submitted a proof in the local 
liquidation prior to the discharge of the debt under the 
foreign governing law. 
Wight v Eckhardt Marine 
Wight concerned a claim by Eckhardt against the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd 
('BCCI(0)') under a guarantee issued by a branch office 
of BCCI(0) in Chittagong, Bangladesh. The guarantee, 
which was governed by the law of Bangladesh, had been 
issued shortly before the collapse of the BCCI group in 
July 1991 .' Because BCCI(0) was incorporated in the 
Cayman Islands, a winding-up petition was presented 
there in July 1991, and in January 1992, a winding-up 
order was made. In due course, the appellants were 
appointed as liquidators of BCCI(0). 
In May 1992, Eckhardt entered a proof of debt in the 
winding up in the Cayman Islands for the amount owing 
under the guarantee. The liquidators initially indicated that 
they would accept Eckhardt's proof. However, in the 
meantime, the Government in Bangladesh 'preferred to go 
its own way'4 and, in August 1992, acting pursuant to 
Bangladeshi legislation, put in place a scheme for the 
reconstruction of the branch of BCCI(0) in Bangladesh. 
The effect of this scheme was to create a new entity, called 
the 'Eastern Bank', the ownership of which was to be 
divided between the Government, various financial institu- 
tions and certain depositors at the former BCCI(0) branch. 
Under the scheme, the Eastern Bank took over all the assets 
of BCCI(0)'s branch in Bangladesh. In relation to liabilities, 
the scheme (apparently) sought to discharge the liabilities of 
BCCI(0) in Bangladesh and create corresponding obligations 
on the part of the Eastern Bank.' In December 1995, the 
liquidators rejected Eckhardt's proof of debt owing to the 
apparent discharge of BCCI(0)'s liability according to the 
law of Bangladesh. Eckhardt appealed to the Cayman 
Islands courts. 
Murphy J held in favour of the liquidators, but his 
decision was reversed by the Court of A ~ p e a l . ~  Before the 
appeal court, Eckhardt primarily relied upon the consideration 
that, under English law, a statutory trust over all of a 
company's property is brought into existence when the 
court makes a winding-up order.' Eckhardt successfully 
argued that when, in January 1992, the court made its 
winding-up order, the original debt owed by BCCI(0) was 
replaced by an interest under a statutory trust; thereafter 
the law of Bangladesh became irrelevant, since it was not 
the governing law of the trust. The liquidators appealed to 
the Privy Council. 
Lord Hoffman's judgment 
Lord Hoffmann, delivering the opinion of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council,8 noted that the facts of the 
case did not give rise to an expropriation of any property of 
Eckhardt, but rather the purported annulment of one debt 
(owed by BCCI(0)) and the creation of another (owed by 
Eastern Bank). His Lordship stated that, as a matter of general 
principle, such a 'statutory novation' was governed by the 
proper law of the debt and was to be distinguished from a 
transfer of title to a debt (the latter being governed by the lex 
situs).' Moreover, the Privy Council accepted the liquidators' 
contention that, under the law of Bangladesh, the August 
1992 scheme had the effect of discharging the contractual 
liability of BCCI(0) to Eckhardt. lo Crucially, their Lordships 
rejected Eckhardt's primary submission that its debt had been 
superseded by an interest under a statutory trust upon the 
making of the court's winding-up order in January 1992. 
Whilst not doubting that the company became a trustee of its 
assets for its creditors upon the making of the winding-up 
order, Lord Hoffmann observed: 
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' . . . their Lordships do not understand how this can 
affect the question of who counts as a creditor 
entitled to prove and receive a distribution under the 
statutory trusts.'" 
In particular, although the making of a winding-up 
order restricted creditors to a collective enforcement 
procedure, it did not 'create new substantive rights in 
the creditors or destroy the old ones'. l 2  As Lord Hoffmann 
stated: 
'It is . . . necessary to remember that a winding-up 
order is not the equivalent of a judgment against the 
company which converts the creditor's claim into 
something juridically different, like a judgment 
debt.' l 3  
The extent of a creditor's interest under the statutory trusts 
had to be ascertained by reference to the amount of the 
creditor's debt; and, whilst all debts were valued as at one 
single date, namely the date of the winding-up order, the 
courts had never been wholly precluded from taking into 
account subsequent events that had a bearing upon the value 
of a claim. As Lord Hoffmann explained: 
' . . . the right to participate at any stage in the process 
of collective enforcement by liquidation depends 
upon being a creditor. So that when the debt was 
discharged under its proper law, it ceased to be 
provable in the Cayman Islands liquidation and was 
properly rejected.' l4  
Accordingly, the Privy Council reversed the Court of 
Appeal's decision and allowed the liquidators' appeal. 
No new substantive rights 
The question whether a winding-up order creates 'new 
substantive rights' and in so doing destroys 'the old ones' 
was considered in relatively recent times in Re Cases of 
T@s Well Ltd." In this earlier decision, Judge Paul Baker 
QC (sitting as a judge of the High Court) spoke specifically 
of the acquisition of 'new rights',I7 commenting: 
'One may conclude that the effect of an order to wind 
up is to convert the contractual rights of the creditors 
into proprietary rights under a trust.'Ix 
Although Taffs Well was not referred to by Lord 
Hoffmann in Wight, there can be no doubt that such 
comments, to the extent that they suggest that new 
substantive rights are created, can no longer be regarded 
as good law. 
No distribution if no longer a creditor 
The facts in Wight, in particular the combination of a 
local liquidation and the foreign restructuring of a 
branch office, were unusual. Nevertheless, the general 
principle of English law to be extracted from Lord 
Hoffmann's judgment is that a liquidator should not 
make a distribution to a person who, under an applicable 
foreign law, has ceased to be a creditor by the time the 
distribution is due to be made. This might loosely be 
referred to as the 'continuing creditor status principle'. 
This principle must logically also be applicable in 
English bankruptcy or administration'" proceedings where 
there is a discharge under an applicable foreign law. In 
addition, there can be no reason to suppose that the 
principle is limited to situations (like that in Wight itself) 
where the discharge under the foreign law is brought into 
existence by the intervention of a foreign governmental 
authority subsequent to the making of the local winding-up 
order."' 
This is particularly relevant once it is observed that 
under some foreign insolvency regimes, perhaps most 
notably Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code (11 
USC)," the discharge of debts will most likely follow 
relatively swiftly after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 
Thus, in a typical voluntary case involving an individual 
debtor under Chapter 7," in which neither a complaint 
objecting to dischargex nor a motion to dismiss the case 
for substantial abuse14 has been filed, a discharge would 
normally be granted about four months after the filing of 
the petition.'" 
It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which an 
insolvent individual'' goes into bankruptcy in both England 
and the United States at roughly the same time. Where 
there are such concurrent proceedings, it is often statedJ7 
that a creditor can enter a claim in both bankruptcies on 
condition that he brings into hotchpot in England any 
amount recovered by way of a dividend in the foreign 
(US) bankruptcy. However, applying the reasoning in 
Wight, because the US bankruptcy law will typically2' 
grant a discharge within a matter of months of commence- 
ment of the bankruptcy, debts governed by US law will 
thereupon be discharged and persons holding such 'debts' 
will no longer have the status of creditors for the 
purposes of the English bankruptcy. In short, the hotch- 
pot doctrine will not be relevant in respect of such 
'creditors', since their claims will no longer be valid as 
far as the English bankruptcy is concerned. (The non- 
applicability of the hotchpot rule in such circumstances 
is not something that has seemingly ever been noticed by 
commentators previously.) 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, where 
there are concurrent English and US bankruptcy proceed- 
ings, a creditor resident in England might reasonably 
decide only to enter a proof in the English bankruptcy (on 
the assumption that dividend levels in the English and US 
cases would be equalised,'" so that entering two proofs 
would merely lead to additional costs). However, where 
such a creditor's debt arises under US law, the effect of the 
discharge under Chapter 7 would be to leave the creditor 
without a valid claim in the English bankruptcy and 
having to scramble to see whether it was too late to enter 
a claim in the US. 
It is perhaps not putting it too highly to state that where 
there are concurrent proceedings, the reasoning in Wight 
may, in certain circumstances, be a trap for the unwary 
creditor.'" Of course, if a creditor's legal advisers are aware 
of the discharge issue, it may be a simple matter to avoid the 
consequences of Wight, for example by requesting that the 
US court delay making a discharge order'l (or, in appropriate 
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circumstances, trying to convince the US court not to exercise 2. Wight v Eckhardt Marine GmbH 120031 UKPC 37 (14 May 2003); 
[2003] 3 WLR 414. its Chapter 7 jurisdiction at all"), or by entering a claim in the 
, See generally, Re BCCI SA [ 19921 BCLC 570; and Re BCCI SA 
US bankruptcy. (NO 2 )  [I9921 BCLC 579. 
4. 
5. 
Possible escape route 6.  
7. 
Although the respondent lost in Wight, Lord Hoffmann's 
judgment might seem to hint at a means by which a 8. 
creditor in a similar position might escape the operation 9. 
of a discharge under the foreign law. Let us assume that 
an English company with a branch in Bangladesh has 
defaulted under a Bangladeshi guarantee. Prior to the 10. 
Supra n 2 at para 3. 
Supra n 2 at para 20. 
See [2000] Cayman Islands LR 325. 
See Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K Construction Ltd [1976] 
AC 167. 
Lords Hoffmann, Nolan, Hobhouse of Woodborough, Scott of 
Foscote and Walker of Gestingthorpe. 
Supra n 2 at paras 14, 15, applying Re United Railwavs of the Havana 
and Regla Warehouses Ltd [1960] Ch 52. Nevertheless, both sides 
agreed that the law of Bangladesh was both the proper law and the 
lex situs. 
Supra n 2 at para 20. Wight was, of course, decided under the 
company going into liquidation in England (and the re- common law, but the position in relation to discharge would be 
construction of its branch in Bangladesh), the relevant no different in England where the Rome Convention and the Contracts (Applicable Law) .4ct 1990 apply: see L Collins (ed) 
creditor might bring a civil claim in England and recover Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws (13th edn, London, 
judgment. Subsequently, faced with a Bangladeshi dis- 2000) at pp 1188-1 189. 
charge, the creditor might argue that, by an application 1 :: i ;E i;: 
of the merger rule," the original debt (governed, of 13. supra n 2 at para 19. 
course, by Bangladeshi law) has indeed been superseded 14. Supra n 2 at para 35. 
by ajudgment of the ~ ~ ~ l i ~ h  courts. F~  ~~~d ~ ~ f f ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  15. In passing, it may be noted that Eckhardt also attempted unsuccess- fully to sue Eastern Bank in the courts in Bangladesh: supra n 2 at 
it will be recalled, stated that a winding-up order was to para 9. 
be contrasted with a iud~ment.  the latter having the effect 16. Re Cases of Tuffs Well Ltd [I9921 Ch 179. 
J V " 
of converting 'the creditor's claim into something i: Eiraatn 191. 
juridically different'. The original debt, it would be 19. under the Insolvency Act 1986, Pt 11. 
argued, has been replaced by an English judgment debt 20. For an explanation of why the principle will not apply in relation to 
a foreign limitation period, see Smart [ 2 W ]  CW 39 at 40-41. and law grant a discharge thereof' 2 1 . Chapter 7 applies to both individual and corporate debtors, but only 
not being the proper law in respect thereof. AS far as an individual is given a discharge: see United States Bankruptcy 
these commentators are aware. there is no authoritv Code (USBC) 8 727(a)(l). In contrast, in Chapter 11 re~r~anisations, 
directly on point. Nevertheless, in practical terms, it 
would appear that the management of the company34 
debts are generally discharged upon the confirmation of the plan: 
see USBC 3 1141. Less well known outside the United States are 
Chapter 12 (adiustment of debts of a family farmer with regular 
might negate such a strategy by allowing any judgment ann"a1 income) -and Chapter 13 (adjustment o i  debts of an individual 
to go by default. For a liquidator is not bound by a default with regular income), both of which postpone a discharge until after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan or until he 
judgment and has always been allowed to look behind is granted a 'hardship discharge': see USBC $9 1228, 1328. 
a default judgment when dealing with a creditor's proof 
of debt.35 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Wight v Eckhardt Marine confirms that 
the statutory trust arising upon liquidation does not 
affect the principle that the right to participate in a 
distribution depends upon the retention of the status of a 
creditor up to the very time the liquidator makes the 
distribution. Accordingly, a discharge under an applicable 
foreign law36 may cause a creditor to miss out on any 
22. A 'voluntary' case is a case in which an eligible debtor tiles the 
petition with the clerk of the bankruptcy court; the filing of the 
petition commences the case and the commencement constitutes an 
order for relief (USBC 5 301). This occurs automatically; no action 
is taken by the court. Voluntary cases account for the great majority 
of cases. In contrast, in an 'involuntary' case under USBC 3 303, that 
is a case commenced against an eligible debtor (normally by three 
creditors of the debtor), the filing of the petition does not constitute 
an order for relief. Rather, a court order is necessary. Where the 
debtor does not timely controvert the petition, the court must order 
relief; where the debtor does timely controvert the petition, the court, 
after trial, shall order relief only where the creditors have established 
the statutory grounds (USBC 3 303(h)). 
23. Pursuant to USBC Rule 4W(a) ,  a complaint objecting to discharge 
(by creditors, the trustee or the United States trustee) must be filed 
no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors 
dividend. As this principle is also applicable in personal under USBC 3 341(a), unless an extension has been $anted under 
insolvency cases, practitioners may need to exercise USBC Rule 4004(b). Section 341 provides that the meeting of creditors must be held 'within a reasonable time after the order for 
particular caution when dealing with concurrent bank- relief is made. USBC Rule 2003(a) provides that the meeting be held 
ruptcy proceedings where the foreign law, as is the case no fewer than 20 and no more than 40 days after the order for relief, 
under Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code, provides unless the meeting is held at a place which is not regularly staffed by the United States trustee or an assistant who may preside at the 
for a rapid3' discharge. meeting, in which case the meeting must be held within 60 days of 
the order for relief. 
philip smart, ~~~~~i~~~ professor, university of 24. USBC 3 707(b) enables the court. on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, to dismiss a Chapter 7 case filed by an 
Hung Kong, individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it 
and Charles D Booth, Director, Asian Institute of finds that the granting of relief would be-a substantial abuse of 
International Financial h w ,  University of Hung Kong Chapter 7. USBC Rule 1017(e) provides that unless an extension has been granted, the United States trustee must file such a motion within 
60 dais of the first date set for the 3 341 meeting of creditors. 
NOTES 25. See 'Bankruptcy Basics' Public Information Series, Bankruptcy 
Judges Division, Administrative Office of the US Courts, at http:// 
1 .  See Jabez Henry The Judgment of the Court of Demerura in the www.mwb.uscourts.gov/forms/localforms/INFOO4.pdf USBC Rule 
Case of Odwin v Forbes (London, S Sweet, 1823); and Graham 4004(c)(l) provides that subject to limited exceptions set out in Rule 
'Discovering Jabez Henry; Cross-Border Insolvency in the 19th 4004(c)(l) and (2). on the expiration of the time fixed for filing a 
Century' (2001) 10 IIR 153. complaint objecting to discharge and the time fixed for filing a 
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motion to dismiss a case for substantial abuse (normally 60 days 
following the first date set for the 5 341 meeting), the court 'shall 
forthwith' grant the discharge. 
2 6. For example, a businessman, originally from the US and owning real 
properties there, who runs various international corporations (with 
their centre of the operations in England but also with activities in 
the US) and has guaranteed their indebtedness. 
27. See eg, Dicey and Morris, supra n 10 at p 1176. 
28. Particularly in a voluntary case: see supra n 22. 
29. See Re Macfadyen & Co [I9081 1 KB 675. 
30. A discharge occurring in an English bankruptcy will not present 
similar problems to creditors in the English proceedings, for section 
281(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 expressly states that a discharge 
(under the 1986 Act) has no effect on the rights of a creditor to enter 
a proof in the bankruptcy for a debt from which the bankrupt has 
been released. Section 281(1), of course, has nothing to say about 
the effect of a foreign discharge. 
The ten grounds for objection to discharge listed in USBC 9 727(a) 
are exclusive: see Charles Tabb The Law of Bankruptcy (Westbury, 
New York: The Foundation Press, Inc, 1997) at p 692. Therefore, 
an English creditor may not rely on this section. Perhaps the best 
strategy would be to seek the exercise of the court's general equitable 
powers under USBC 5 105(a). 
An alternative to a full Chapter 7 case (with discharge issues) might 
be the commencement of a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding 
under USBC 9 304. 
See, generally, Dicey and Morris, supra n 10, at p 482 in relation to 
merger and a foreign judgment. 
Ie prior to the winding up. 
See eg, Re Focus Insurance Co Ltd [I9961 BCC 659 at 662 per 
Scott VC. 
However late in the day. 
Rapid, that is, when compared to the length of time it takes before 
final distributions are made in the English bankruptcy. 
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